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Cameron Fraser's avatar

Although the handling of the glide and landing were exemplary, there is a bit more to it that that. The crew's initial response transferring fuel from the working engine to the leaking one, relying on memory rather than the fuel imbalance checklist, didn't just make the situation worse... It turned a problem into an emergency. Had they not opened the crossfeed, only one engine would have suffered fuel exhaustion, and they could have continued to a single engine landing.

As it happens, a number of years later an old friend of mine was invited to ride the jump seat in an Airbus 320 Sim, while another old friend did some practice. (He was a training Captain who loved nothing more than getting into the sim in his off time and practicing emergencies.) One of the emergencies simulated was system failure that resulted in loss of the ABS. As the sim shuddered to a halt on "landing" our friend in the jumpseat said "that's very realistic". When he was asked how he knew, he revealed that he and his family had been on that Air Transat flight. They, along with a fair number of the passengers, are part of a study on the long term affects of PTSD.

Dwight D. Eisenhower's avatar

Two questions:

1) Why did Capt Piché do a 360 and then a series of S-turns to "dissipate excess altitude"?

Isn't altitude in that situation his most precious possession? Wouldn't giving it up lessen his chances of making Lajes airport?

2) You often refer to the importance of checklists in dealing with emergencies. I was surprised to read in Wikipedia (citing the investigation) "Rather than referring to the appropriate checklists, the crew actioned procedures from memory, and this resulted in the cross-feeding of fuel into an already leaking engine." (Wikipedia "Air Transat Flight 236")

You mentioned this briefly, but I would have expected you to highlight this as one of the important lessons of this near-disaster.

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